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Article 4

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
EXPULSION

OF COLLEGE AND PROFESSIONAL STUDENTS
-RIGHTS
AND REMEDIES

Introduction
College students of all ages have had at least one thing in common -a
certain
number of them are bound to get into trouble. In fact, much of our knowledge of
the students of medieval universities comes from the records of police courts, to
which the extracurricular activities of the students often led them.' Modem students,
too, often find themselves subjects of disciplinary action, as evidenced by three
recent cases-Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education,2 in which six Negro
students were expelled from the Alabama State Teachers College for allegedly
participating in a "sit-in" demonstration; Knight v. State Board of Education,3 in
which a group of students was expelled for being arrested in connection with a
"freedom ride"; and Carr v. St. John's University,4 in which four students were
expelled from a Catholic university for participating in a civil marriage ceremony.
The problem in this area is a familiar one: colleges and universities must have
the power to establish and enforce rules, both disciplinary and academic, in order
to further their interests, while the student charged with a violation of these rules
has the opposing interest of protecting himself from being arbitrarily deprived of
educational opportunities.
It will be the purpose of this note to examine the rights of students when
faced with lengthy suspensions or expulsion on grounds of misconduct, and the
remedies available to them when these rights are violated. Of particular concern
is the right of the student to notice and hearing before the infliction of severe
penalties.
Reluctance of Courts to Intervene in School Discipline
The first obstacle to face a student complaining of an injustice in his dismissal
is the extreme reluctance of the courts to enter into the area of college discipline.
A typical position is that taken by the court in Frank v. Marquette University,5
in holding that university officials could not be compelled to produce records to
justify dismissal of a student for certain conduct although others had not incurred
a similar penalty for the same conduct. "So long as they [university officials] act in
response to sufficient reasons and not arbitrarily or capriciously, their acts may not
be interfered with by the courts." Judicial cautiousness was also shown by the
District Court of Massachusetts in Dehaan v. Brandeis University7 in saying that
"The court is in a poor position indeed to substitute its judgment for that of the
university .. ." This judicial reluctance has not been confined to the American
courts. In University of Ceylon v. Fernando9 the Privy Council upheld the procedure
employed in the dismissal of a student as being a matter entirely within the discretion
of the vice-chancellor in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of authority.
Although most courts appear reluctant to intervene in behalf of an expelled
student, this reluctance can be overcome, and dismissal of students without notice
and the opportunity to be heard has been held an abuse for which the courts will
grant relief. For example, in the early English case of The King v. Chancellor of
the University of Cambridge,'0 where a master was deprived of his academic degrees
without notice or hearing, the court condemned the procedure as "contrary to
1

LA MONTE, THE WORLD OF THE MIDDLE AGES 573 (1949).

2 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
3 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
4 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, aff'd, N.Y. (1962).
5
6

209 Wis. 372, 245 N.W. 125 (1932).
Id. at 127; but see, oilthe question of unequal treatment, State ex rel. Nelson v. Lincoln

Medical College, 81 Neb.533, 116 N.W.294 (1908).
7 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957).
8

Id. at 627.

9

1 Weekly L.R. 223 (P.C. 19&.O).

10

2 Ld. Raym. 1334, 92 Eng. Rep. 370 (K.B. 1732).

NOTES
natural justice." -A student dismissed under similar circumstances was reinstated
in Gleason v. University of Minnesota"l because of abuse of discretion on the part
of the university officials.
In most of the cases where some sort of hearing, however brief and informal,
has been held, the courts have deferred to the discretion of the school officials.
In State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp" 2 it was held that any method adopted by the
university president, except where such is a clear abuse of his authority, would
not be interfered with. No abuse of discretion was found where a student nurse
was dismissed on one hour's notice and without any opportunity to hear the
evidence against her,' 3 and a similar result was reached
where the only hearing
4
consisted of an interview with the dean of women.1
One reason advanced for the court's reluctance in this area is that given in
Gott v. Berea College.'5 College officials, according to this view, stand in loco
parentis with regard to the physical, mental, and moral training of their students
and may make any rules or regulations which parents might make for the same
purpose and, presumably, enforce them as parents might. Though this view seems.
to be implicit in a number of the decisions,' 6 the argument seems to falter
with regard to present-day students, large numbers of whom have reached their
majority, are married, and are paying for their own education; when used to
justify the dismissal
of students without notice or hearing, the analogy breaks down
7
completely.'
The reluctance of courts to interfere in cases of college- disciplinary action is
founded on the historical independence of universities from intervention by outsiders in their internal affairs - an independence which continues to be guarded
jealously by the universities.' Admittedly college officials are in a better position
than the courts to administer discipline, but the attitude of judicial self-restraint
in such matters should not be allowed to countenance an injustice to the dismissed
student.
Attendance - Right or Privilege?
School officials sometimes rationalize their asserted authority to dismiss students
summarily on the grounds that attendance is a privilege which is revocable at will
by the grantor. Such an argum6nt raises the question of whether attendance is a
privilege or a right and the further question: does it make any difference?
Some courts have based their analysis of the rights of dismissed students on
this right-privilege question; others have disregarded this categorization and looked
11 104 Minn. 359, 116 N.W.650 (1908).
12 81 Mont.200, 263 Pac. 433 (1928).
13 Beatty v.Bd.of Managers of Binghamton City Hosp., 130 Misc. 181, 224 N.Y.Supp. 201
(Sup. Qt. 1927).
14 Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924).
15 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913).
16 E.g., John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 55 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924); Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924).
17 Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77, 87-88 (1887).
It might well be a subject of discussion what is meant by parental discipline when applied to a man who has attained his majority; and, even in
the case of a minor son, the circumstances would be rare, which could
demand an expulsion from the parental roof and the hospitalities and associations of home. Nor even if such circumstances existed, would any prudent
parent impose so serious a penalty, without first consulting the primary
sources of his information, and freely communicating them to his accused
son, and according to him the amplest time and opportunity to exculpate
himself.
18 This was illustrated by the recent action of the Southern Association of Colleges and
Secondary Schools in the aftermath of the intervention of state officials in the University of
Mississippi integration controversy. All of the state colleges in Mississippi were warned that
any further interference by state officials in student discipline would result in loss of accreditation. N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1962, p. 39, col. 3.
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instead at the hearing afforded the, student. In.State ex.rel. Sherman v. Hyman'9
the court chose the former. .approach. and, although -it .conceded the study of
medicine to be a property right, it held the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment not applicable where the school enforces its rules of conduct in a
reasonable manner. The tatter. approach was taken by the courts in Dixon v.
Alabama State Board of Education20 and Knight v. State Board of Education,21
both cases involving state-supported schools. The courts felt that categorization
was irrelevant in these cases, for both privileges and rights are entitled .to the
protection of due process of law. The Dixon court stated that when the revocation
of a privilege granted by the .government necessarily involves injury to the individual, the Constitution requires such action to be in accordance with due process,
and the court in Knight said that "Private interests are to be evaluated under the
due process clause . . ., not in terms of labels or fictions, but in terms of their true
significance and worth. 12 2 These courts find their foundation in Cafeteria and
Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy,23 where the Supreme Court upheld the
proposition that due process protects more than judicially-defined "rights," and in

Weiman v. Updegraff, 4 where the Supreme Court said, with regard to a government employee's dismissal:
We do not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public
employment exists. It is sufficient to say that Constitutional protection does
extend to the public servant25whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently
arbitrary or discriminatory.
School Officials -

Types of Authority -

In General

No discussion can be made of the limits of the discretion of college officials
without first considering the nature of the authority exercised by such officials. 2
Two types of authority are exercised by administrative bodies- here, by the school
boards and officials. On the one hand, the body acts in a legislative capacity in
establishing rules and regulations for governing a college or university in general,
while its function in enforcing such regulations is essentially judicial in character.
To establish, for example, a rule that any student who participates in unauthorized
public demonstrations will be liable to expulsion is quite a different matter from
determining that a particular student has violated this rule by participation in a
public demonstration and is therefore subject to dismissal. In the former case, the
officials are creating general policy and rely on arguments concerning the wisdom
of the proposed rule, while when acting judicially, they are gathering facts, often
in dispute, to prove or disprove an accusation.
Whenever an administrative body acts in a legislative capacity, as found in Bi-

Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization,2 7 the Fourteenth Amend-

ment does not require a hearing for each individual affected before the general
ruling is made. When administrative officials act in a judicial capacity, however,
"under the requirements of procedural due process there must be notice to affected
28
parties and an opportunity to be heard."
19

180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943).

20

294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).

21
22
23

200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
Id. at 178.
367 U.S. 886 (1961).

24 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
25 Id. at 192.
26 For a general discussion of the authority of state college officials see Ray, Powers and

Authorities of the Governing Bodies of State Colleges and Universities, 17 Ky. L.J. 15 (1928).

A discussion of legislative authority of school boards in a particular situation is found in Kissick
v. Garland Independent School District, 330 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). See treatment,
36 NoTR DAME LAW. 89 (1960).
27 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
28 United States v. McCrillis, 200 F.2d 884, 888 (lst Cir. 1952).

NOTES.
Limitations on Rule-Making Powers of School Officials
Although school officials are allowed wide discretion in establishing- the rules
and regulations which govern their schools, -there must be limits placed on this
power. Any rule, the violation of which may entail so severe a -punishment as
expulsion from a college or professional school, should be specific enough to forewarn the student of the consequences of his action. This is not to say, however,
that university regulations must meet the standards of specificity required of a
penal code. The regulation in question in Carr v. St. John's University 9 required
"conformity with the ideals of Christian education and- conduct." It was condemned by the trial court as "so vague and indefinite that men of common intelligence must necessarily conjecture as to its meaning and differ as to its application."30 Even a moral theologian might be hard put to apply such a standard
to every activity of student life.
The court in Knight v. State Board of Educations' suggested a possible limitation on the rule-making discretion. There must be a reasonable connection between
the misconduct proscribed by a rule and the interest which the school is seeking
to protect under the rule before students can be dismissed. In Knight, a directive
of the Tennessee Commissioner of Education called for dismissal of any student
arrested and convicted on charges involving personal misconduct on the ground
that such misconduct reflects discredit upon the institution in which the student is
enrolled. From this the court concluded that not only must the college president
determine that a student has been arrested and convicted, but also that the misconduct in question was of a type and of such gravity that it would reflect discredit
and dishonor upon the school.
Another limitation on the rule-making authority of school officials should be
a requirement that the punishment fit the offense. Since there is a wide array of
penalties, including various types of probation, suspension, and expulsion, open to
college officials, it is not too difficult to match the punishment to the offense.
An example of a seemingly overharsh penalty is found in People ex rel.
O'Sullivan v. New York Law School. 2 There a student member of a committee
assisting in making arrangements for commencement became incensed over what
he considered an instance of bad faith on the part of the school officials in regard
to the arrangements. In a private interview with the dean of the law school, the
student allegedly was contumacious. The dean expelled him. The court held that
the student was not entitled to mandamus to compel the award of his diploma,
but that he was entitled to a certificate of attendance and successful passage of
examinations. There were other, not so drastic, courses open to the dean in this
situation: the awarding of the degree might have been postponed; or adverse
recommendations, based on this incident, might be given to employers and others
who might inquire about the student's law school record.
In some isolated instances the courts have attacked the regulations themselves,
as in State ex rel. Clark v. Osborne3 3 where the court held that the school had
exceeded its authority in making and enforcing a regulation requiring students to
obtain permission from the school before attending social affairs. The case arose
when a student was expelled after attending a party with her father's permission
and in the company of her brother, but
34 without the requisite permission of the
school. The court ordered reinstatement.
29 231 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, aff'd

N.Y.,
30
31
32

N.Y.S.2d (1962).
Id. at 413.
200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
68 Hun 118, 22 N.Y.Supp. 663 (Sup. Ct. 1893).

33 24 Mo. App. 309 (1887).
34 But cf. United States ex tel. Gannon v. Georgetown College, 28 App. D.C. 87 (1908).
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Requirement of Notice and Hearing Before Dismissal
Generally it can be said that schools are required to give notice and hold
a hearing before dismissing students from school, and this is true whether the
school is tax-supported or a private institution. The genesis of this rule is found
in a 1732 case in which the King's Bench condemned the deprivation, without
notice or hearing, of a master's academic degrees.3 5 An early case in this country
a student is entitled to a hearing with
extended the rule, the court holding that
the incidents of a trial before expulsion.3 6
With regard to tax-supported institutions, this rule might be considered
unanimous, the only possible exception being People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of
Trustees,17 in which a woman medical student was expelled from the University
of Illinois for allegedly cheating in examinations. But even in this case the opinion
is somewhat ambiguous, and perhaps the inference can be made from the holding
that though no "formal" hearing was required, at least some sort of fact-finding
is necessary. This inference is supported by the court's citation of Smith v. Board
of Education, s in which it was said that "the Board of Education is authorized
in a reasonable and parliamentary way to investigate charges of disobedience or
misconduct...."39

A number of cases strongly imply that notice and hearing are required before
dismissal because of the discussions of the adequacy of the hearing which was
held. 40 Necessity of a hearing also seems to have been implied where a student
was held not to have exhausted his recourse to the school officials before appealing
42
to the court, 41 and in cases where he was held to be seeking the wrong remedy.
Although the general rule has not been as universally applied in the case of
private schools as with tax-supported schools, some courts have required more than
The
minimal hearings when students have been dismissed from private institutions.
43
court in State ex rel. Arbour v. Board of Managers of Presbyterian Hospital said
that if the student had not made any agreement to submit controversies to a particular body and be bound by its decisions, she was entitled to notice and a public
trial and hearing, including the right to be confronted by witnesses against her and
to be heard in her own defense and through witnesses. In Koblitz v. Western
Reserve University44 less emphasis was placed upon the procedural requirements,
but the court held that the faculty should allow a dismissed law student every fair
him
opportunity of showing his innocence and act upon evidence received against
45
with the fairness expected of jurors. In Baltimore University v. Colton, a law
student denied permission to take his final examinations was held to be entitled
to mandamus, on the grounds that he had not been given sufficient notice.
In cases in which it was held that private schools were under no obligation to
afford a hearing to students before dismissal, the courts have usually found that
the university reserved a contractual right of summary dismissal, or that the
student had otherwise waived his right to a hearing. In Dehaan v. Brandeis Uni35 The King v. Chancellor of the University of Cambridge, 2 Ld. Raym. 1334, 92 Eng. Rep.
370 (K.B. 1732).
36 Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77 (1887).
37 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 134 N.E. 635 (1956).
38 182 Ill. App. 342 (1913).
39 Id. at 346.
40 See Steier v.New York Educ. Comm'r, 161 F. Supp. 549 (E.D.N.Y. 1958) ;State ex rel.
Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433 (1928); Beatty v. Bd. of Managers of Binghamton City Hosp., 130 Misc. 181, 224 N.Y.Supp. 201 (Sup. Ct. 1927); Tanton v. McKenney,
226 Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924); University of Ceylon v. Fernando, 1 Weekly L.R. 223
(P.C. 1960).
41 See State ex rel. Dodd v. Tison, 175 La. 235, 143 So. 59 (1932).
42 See State ex. rel. Arbour v. Bd. of Managers of Presbyterian Hosp., 131 La. 163, 59
So. 108 (1912); Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909).
43 131 La. 163, 59 So. 108 (1912).
44 21 Ohio C.C.R. 144 (1901).
45 48 Md.623, 57 Ad. 14 (1904).
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versity," where the university had reserved the power of dismissal without showing
cause, the court said "While it might be a better policy to hold a hearing whenever
any disciplinary action is contemplated by the university, I hold as a matter of law
that the defendant is not required to do so." 47 In Robinson v. University of Miami4"
the court stated what it considered to be a general principle that a private university
may exercise a reserved right to dismiss summarily as long as the action is taken
in good faith and without malice; and in Barker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 9
it was held that a private college need not prefer charges and prove them at a trial
before expelling a student if its regulations so allowed.
The most extreme case involving a dismissal under the university's reservation
of summary dismissal is Anthony v. Syracuse University.50 A woman student was
held to have waived her right to a hearng before dismissal by signing registration
cards which referred to that section of the university catalogue which stated that
"attendance at the University is a privilege and not a right" and that the school,
in order to protect its ideals of scholarship and its moral atmosphere, reserved the
right to dismiss students without giving any reason therefor. The court's opinion
illustrates the impossible situation in which an expelled student is placed by such
a provision.
The University may only dismiss a student for reasons falling within two
classes, one in connection with safeguarding the University's ideals of
scholarship, and the other in connection with safeguarding the University's
moral atmosphere. When dismissing a student, no reason -for dismissing need
be given. The University must, however, have a reason, and that reason
must fall within one of the two classes mentioned above. Of course, the
University authorities have wide discretion in determining what situation
does and what does not fall within the classes mentioned, and the courts
would be slow indeed in disturbing any decision of the University authorities in this respect.
When the plaintiff comes into court and alleges a breach of contract,
the burden rests upon her to establish such breach. She must show that her
dismissal was not for a reason within the terms of the regulation. The
record here is meager on this subject. While no adequate reason was assigned by the University authorities for the dismissal, I find nothing in the
record on which to base a finding that no such reason existed. She offered
no testimony, either as to her character and relation with her college associates, or as to her scholarship and attention to her academic duties. The evithe terms of the
dence discloses no reason for her dismissal not falling within
regulation. It follows, therefore, that the action fails. 51
If the court means what it says, it is difficult to see what benefit the plaintiff

would have derived from introducing evidence as to her character and scholarship;
indeed, it is difficult to conceive of any method short of mind reading by which
the plaintiff could have sustained the burden of proof cast upon her.
When one considers the relative bargaining power of the parties and the ability
of the student to effect any change in the terms of his admission, the analogy to
the yellow dog labor contract is obvious. If such waiver provisions are not so
outrageous as to be unenforceable as opposed to public policy and traditional
standards of fairness, the courts might well refuse to enforce them on grounds of
unconscionability.
Although the courts have had more difficulty, where they have been so inclined,
in finding an obligation on the part of private educational institutions to afford
a student faced with a charge of misconduct notice and a fair hearing, elementary
fairness seems to dictate that this obligation should exist. Professor Seavey finds it
shocking for courts to uphold state-supported schools in denying to students "the
46 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957).
47 Id. at 627.
48 100 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1958).
49 278 Pa. 121, 122 Atl. 220 (1923). Cf. John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 55 Fla. 510, 102
So. 637 (1924).
50 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.Supp. 435 (1928).
51 Id. at 440.
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-protection given to a pickpocket," 52 , and it is hardly less shocking, in the- case of
private', schools.
.
The. position of' faculty members is somewhat of an anomoly with regard to
school discipline. On- the one hand they are often charged with enforcing student
dicipline, reaching such results as in Anthony. On the other hand, they, have
banded togethei in the American Association of University Professors, in an. effort
.to.enfrce -their:own iights. The Association's 1940 Statement of Principles on
Acidemi.. .Freedo-' and, Tenure53 calls, in cases where facts co cern.ing dismissal
are in dispute, for notice in' w-iting of the charge, .n opp rinty to be heard by
al -bodies that pass judgment on the case, representation by cousise, and-a full
.. eziographic record of the hearing available to all of the parties concerned. Universities .found guilty of violating these rights of faculty members are subject to
:c.su.e'y the'.A.A..P.
'Natur .of Hearing Required
".The courts have- displayed. little. agreement in discussing, the nature of the
hearing which is required before a school may impose disciplinary sanctions against
a student. They have varied between the extremes of requiring a full trial-type
hearing to upholding an appearance before a single official as sufficient. In Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley54 a school which received state benefits expelled a
student for allegedly participating in riotous conduct. He was reinstated because
none of the witnesses against him had appeared at the hearing. The court held
that the student was entitled to notice of the exact nature of the charge against
him, and further:
He was entitled to know what testimony had been given against him, and by
whom it had been delivered, and that the proofs be made openly and in 'his
presence, with a full opportunity to question
the witnesses and to call others
to explain or contradict their testimony. 55
The court pointed out that the evidence received against the student in the hearing
from a janitor of known incredibility and from a student who was never identified
"ought not to be and would not be received as competent testimony in the determination of the most trivial rights in the most petty tribunal in the land."' 56
The view just described, unfortunately, is in the minority. The reluctance of
the judiciary to interfere with the discretion of school officials, as previously developed, is reflected in, the more widely held view that almost any sort of hearing
will suffice.s 7
When a state-supported school, as in Dixon, is required by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to give hearings to students before dismissing
them, the question arises as to what type of hearing will suffice. The Dixon court
recognized the principle enunciated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Joint AntiFascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath:5"
Due process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is
a process. .

.

. The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely

affected, the manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the
available alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the protection
implicit in the office of the functionary whose conduct is challenged, the

balance of hurt complained of and good accomplished - these5 9are some of
the considerations which must enter into the judicial judgment.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the same opinion indicates his belief that "fairness can
rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights." 60
52
53
54

Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARv. L. REv. 1406, 1407 (1957).
Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors, March, 1952, pp. 116-24.
3 Pa. County Ct. 77 (1887).

55 Id. at 82.
56 Id. at 83.
57

58
59
60

Cases cited notes 5-9 supra.

341 U.S. 123 (1951).
Id. at 163 (concurring opinion).
Id. at 170 (concurring opinion).

NOTES
What seems to be a result of the application of the Frankfurter test of due
process was the decision reached by the Privy Council, in University of Ceylon v.
Fernando.6 A student who was allegedly cheating was expelled following a hearing
in which he was not allowed to confront, or cross-examine, the witnesses against
him. The expulsion was upheld. The Privy Council admitted that "the plaintiff
might have fared better if the charge against him had been tried in accordance
with the more meticulous procedure of a court of law," 62 including cross-examination
of the chief witness against him, but this was not the question as the Privy Council
saw it. "The question is whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of this
particular case, the mode of procedure adopted by the Vice-Chancellor, in bona fide
exercise of the wide discretion as to procedure reposed in him under clause 8, [of
the university charter] sufficiently complied with the requirements of natural
justice." 63 In this case, since the procedure which was adopted admittedly might
have been the cause of the loss of a valuable right or privilege, what assurance is
there that "natural justice" is satisfied? Perhaps the solution to the problem is to
be reached only by adhering to strict procedural safeguards, as proposed by Mr.
Justice Douglas:
It is not without significance that most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights
are procedural. It is procedure that spells much of the difference between rule
by law and rule by whim or caprice. Steadfast adherence to strict procedural
safeguards is our main assurance that there will be equal justice under law.64

In the face of the almostuniversal reluctance of the courts to question the exercise
of the broad discretionary power allowed college administrators in establishing
regulations, it would seem that
the procedures for enforcing such regulations ought
65
to be more rigidly scrutinized.
The procedural device most often discussed by the courts in relation to the
elements of a fair hearing, and the one most often held not essential in student
dismissal cases, is the confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. 66 One court
observed that students should not be subjected to cross-examination, because
"honorable students do not like to be known as snoopers and informers against
their fellows."'6 7 According to this court, then, the honorable course is to remain
a nameless informer -a
course of action which has been characterized as:
[A] field for rumor, for malice, for prejudice, for falsehood, to roam in,
leading to conduct on the part of the University which might be entirely
honest, but at the same time based upon a total lack or misapprehension of
facts!6S

Another court objected to any requirement of production or cross-examination
of witnesses on grounds that the university president had no authority to compel
the presence or testimony of witnesses.6 9 There seems, on the contrary, to be no
reason why students, at least, could not be compelled to appear and testify. The
fact that students would be testifying under compulsion would also serve to remove
the stigma attached to "informing."
The McCauley court warned against giving school officials a completely free
hand in setting up hearing procedures. Although the administrators may be learned
61 1 Weekly L.R. 223 (P.C. 1960).
62 Id. at 236.
63 Ibid.
64 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951) (concurring
opinion).
65 See De Smith, University Discipline and Natural Justice, 23 MODERN L. Rv. 428, 431
(1960).
[The importance of imposing such duties becomes
greater, not less, where
the discretion of the deciding authority is so wide as to be almost unreviewable on its merits.
66 E.g., State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433 (1928).
67 State ex. rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822, 826 (1942).
68 130 Misc. 181, 223 N.Y.Supp. 796 (Sup. Ct.) rev'd, 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.Supp.
435 (1928).
69 State ex. rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433 (1928).
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in other fields, "their conceptions of what would be competent evidence of guilt
' 0
may be at variance with all established legal principles. ",
As an example of this
possibility, the court quoted the testimony of one of the faculty members to the
effect that the fact of the student's turning pale when called before the committee
was evidence that he understood, without being told, that he was being called upon
to deny his guilt.
In the Dixon case, the court said that something more is required than an
informal interview with a college official, but not a full dress judicial hearing
with the right to cross-examine witnesses. The court found no balancing interest
such as danger to the public or to national security which would justify college
authorities in refusing at least to give students adequate notice and the opportunity
to be heard in their own defense. Two reasons were given to justify less than a
full judicial hearing-the possible disruption of the college's educational atmosphere, and the impracticality of carrying out such a proceeding. In any case, the
court said that as a minimum, a student faced with dismissal should be given the
names of the witnesses against him, a report of facts to which the witnesses have
testified, an opportunity to present his defense, and the right to produce witnesses
inhis own behalf.71 It would also seem only fair that in dismissal hearings, where
the college officials are acting as judge, jury, and prosecutor, any official who is
a party to a dispute which is involved in the misconduct charge should be obliged
to disqualify himself from any part in passing upon the case.
Remedies for Unjust Dismissal

Several remedies may be available in the courts to the student who has been
expelled unjustly, after he has first exhausted the internal remedies available to him,7
provided such appeals would not be futile 73 or unreasonably protracted. One remedy
is statutory. New York provides by statute 74 for a system of internal appeals to the
state commissioner of education, whose decision, when sought, is final and unreviewable. In Steier v. New York State Education Commissioner,7 where a student
appealed the decision of a commission which passed on his case to the United
States District Court without first going to the commissioner of education or to
the state courts,76 the complaint was dismissed for failure to exhaust internal
remedies and for lack of federal jurisdiction.
The most commonly sought remedy is mandamus, which can be used either
to require school officials to hold a hearing, 7 for outright reinstatement, 8 or to
compel award of a diploma.' 9 Since this legal remedy is ordinarily used to compel
public officials and those of public or private corporations to perform some official
duty, it is an appropriate remedy in cases involving both public and private incorporated schools. This remedy, however, has been held not to lie to enforce what
were called private contract rights against an incorporated college80 and not at all
70 3 Pa. County Ct. at 88.
71 294 F.2d at 159.
72 State ex rel. Dodd v. Tison, 175 La. 235, 143 So. 59 (1923); In re Dunn, 9 Pa. County
Ct. 417 (1891).
73 State ex rel. Clark v. Osborne, 24 Mo. App. 309 (1887).
74
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75 161 F. Supp. 549 (E.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 966 (1960).
76 These seem to be alternative remedies, and the statute making the commissioner's decision final and unreviewable has been upheld in the New York courts. Bullock v. Cooley, 225

N.Y. 566, 122 N.E. 630 (1919).
77 People ex rel. Goldenkoff v. Albany Law School, 198 App. Div. 460, 191 N.Y.Supp. 349
(1921) (dictum).
78 Baltimore Univ. v. Colton, 48 Md. 623, 57 At. 14 (1904).
79 People ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hosp. Medical College, 60 Hun 107, 14 N.Y.Supp. 490
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd 128 N.Y. 621, 28 N.E. 253 (1891).
80 State ex rel. Burg v. Milwaukee Medical College, 128 Wis. 7, 106 N.W. 116 (1906).
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against an unincorporated private college. 8' In State ex rel. Arbour v. Board of
Managers of Presbyterian Hospital12 the remedy was held not to lie where the
student was suing as a dismissed member of a corporation, on the grounds that
students are not members of the corporation. 3 Since mandamus is an extraordinary
legal remedy, it was held in State ex rel. Burg v. Milwaukee Medical College4
that the remedy would not lie where damages or specific performance are available.
Relief by way of injunction is the same as that afforded by mandamus, i.e.,
requirement of a hearin 8 or outright reinstatement."6 The remedy has been held
to lie in cases of both public8 7 and private schools,8 8 but an injunction probably
would not issue where mandamus is available, since in this case the remedy at law
would be adequate.
Two available remedies, damages and specific performance, are based on the
contractual relation between the student and the school. This contract is conceived
of as one by which the student agrees to pay all required fees, maintain the
prescribed level of academic achievement, and observe the school's disciplinary
regulations, in- return for which the school agrees to allow the student to pursue
his course of studies and be granted a diploma upon the successful completion
thereof.89 Since a formal contract is rarely prepared, the general nature and terms
of the agreement are usually implied, with specific terms to be found in the
university bulletin and other publications;9O custom and usages can also become
specific terms by implication.8 ' This contract has been upheld against attacks based
upon lack of consideration, the statute of frauds, and lack of mutuality of obligation.9 2 Remedies based on this contract may be available where some of the other
remedies would fail, e.g., in jurisdictions which would not award mandamus or
injunctive relief against a private corporation, or in instances where the school is
not incorporated.
Damages would seem to be a suitable remedy where the school has breached
its contract by expelling a student without a proper showing of cause and the
student, for various reasons, does not wish to return to that institution. But where
the student does wish to be reinstated, or where he has completed his courses and
is suing to obtain his diploma, damages would not be adequate. In this case specific
performance would be appropriate, subject to the same limitations as the injunction,
viz., that it will not lie where the legal remedy of mandamus is available.
Wrongful discharge of a student would also seem to be a prima facie tort for
which damages may be awarded, subject to the limitation noted by Mechem in
his treatise on public officers,93 that school officials, who are required by law to
exercise their judgment and discretion in the management of schools, act as "quasijudicial" officers and as such are not liable to individuals for any injuries sustained
81 State ex rel. Dodd v. Tison, 175 La. 235, 143 So. 59 (1932).
82 131 La. 163, 59 So. 108 (1912).
83 The court failed to substantiate this contention, however, and historically the conception
of
the student's status has been otherwise. See MtuRAY & CRAIGE, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY
(1926).
University- The whole body of teachers itnd scholars
engaged, at a particular place, in giving and receiving instruction in the higher branches of
learning; such persons associated together as a society or corporate body
with a definite organization and acknowledged powers and privileges....
(emphasis added.)
Baltimore Univ. v. Colton, 48 Md. 623, 57 Ad. 14 (1904).
84 128 Wis. 7, 106 N.W. 116 (1906).
85 Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
86 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th ir. 1961).
87 Ibid.
88 Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., 21 Ohio C.C.R. 144 (1901) (by implication).
89 See, e.g., Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1962).
90 E. g., Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., 21 Ohio C.C.R. 149 (1901).
91 Baltimore Univ. v. Colton, 48 Md. 623, 57 AtI. 14 (1904).
92 Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909).
93 MECHEM, PUBLIC OFFICERS § 718 (1890).
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by reason of any error of judgment, however great, committed by such officials
acting within their jurisdiction and in good faith. This principle is applied to private
school officials also by the courts in holding that the actions of such officials will
not be questioned provided there has not been bad faith or an abuse of discretion
in the carrying out of an official duty.9 4 Adoption of a procedure that is patently
arbitrary, or the conduct of an otherwise correct proceeding in an arbitrary manner,
would seem to satisfy the proviso. In Englehart v. Serena,9 5 a tort action for damages
based on an alleged wrongful dismissal of a student from a dormitory, the plaintiff
found his action dismissed on grounds that he was not a tenant of the dormitory
and had not even the full and unrestricted rights of a lodger - an interesting application of the "privilege" theory.
Factors Influencing Courts' Decisions
There is always a possibility that the nature of the alleged offense may have
had some bearing on the reaction of the court which decided it, but there is little
evidence that such has been the case in the area of school discipline.
The racial issue has been present in three cases dealing with dismissal. Dixon v.
Alabama State Board of Education96 was concerned with a group of Negro students
who were dismissed from Alabama State College for participating in "sit-in" demonstrations, and in Knight v. State Board of Education,9 T the charge was that the
students had been arrested in connection with a "freedom ride." The courts in
both of these cases were careful not to concern themselves with the alleged offense,
but with the question of whether the expulsion procedure had met the test of due
process, and the court in Knight specifically denied that any prejudice had been
established on the part of the university officials in their conduct of the case.
The third case involving a racial issue was Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical
College,98 in which the plaintiffs were denied readmission solely on the basis of
their Negro race. The court found a valid and enforceable contract here, but denied
recovery on grounds that the wrong remedy had been pursued. In this 1909 case
the court said that the school was free to exclude persons on the basis of race if
to do otherwise would mean the loss of some of the other students.
The case of Carr v. St. John's University,99 in which four Catholic students
were expelled from a Catholic university for participating in a civil marriage
ceremony, seems to illustrate what may be an increased reluctance to interfere
with discretion of college officials where a religious question is involved. Although
the Supreme Court of New York ordered reinstatement on grounds that a regulation
the ideals of
which provides for dismissal for conduct not in "conformity with
0
the Appellate
Christian education and conduct" was too vague and indefinite,
Division reversed and held that such a regulation when applied in a Catholic university to Catholic students is sufficiently definite. This decision was affirmed without
opinion by the Court of Appeals. The Appellate Division found also that the
students had been given adequate opportunity to explain their actions. Since the
facts were not in dispute, this procedure would seem to be adequate.
Two cases in which it appears that the decisions may have been affected by
the judges' attitudes toward the alleged misconduct of the student arose out of
the "Red Scare" of World War I. In People ex rel. Goldenkoff v. Albany Law
School,101 where a student was expelled on charges of holding and expressing
94 John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 55 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924).
95 318 Mo. 263, 300 S.W. 268 (1927).
96 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
97 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
98 156 Mich. 954 120 N.W. 589 (1909).
99 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1962).
100 231 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1962).
101 198 App. Div. 460, 191 N.Y.Supp. 349 (1921).
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Socialistic, anarchistic, and unpatriotic views, the court said that there was no
dispute of facts in the case raised by the student's denial that he was a Socialist.
"Moreover, it is to be noted that the assertion of the absence of a statement that
he held such views is a mere conclusion. The mental processes of this petitioner
may be such that he would view expressions of a desire that our form of government be overthrown as highly patriotic."' 0 2 It would seem that a denial by a party
charged with holding certain views that he had ever expressed such views raises
a question of fact. The suspicion is that in this case, decided in 1921 in the midst
of the "Red Scare," the petitioner was being presumed guilty.
The other seeming "Red Scare' case was Samson v. Trustees of Columbia
University,'"3 in which the student was charged with making a publicly-reported
speech advocating resistance to the World War I draft. The language of the court
in speaking of the plaintiff "infecting" the rest of the students indicates the approach
of the court to the case.
One further case in which the court appears to have allowed its own predilections to show through is Tanton v. McKenney,0 4 a case in which an eighteenyear-old girl was expelled after an interview with the dean of women of the college
on a charge of being seen in town smoking, drinking, and seated on the laps of
young men in moving automobiles. The court said that the dean should be commended rather than condemned for upholding old-fashioned ideals of womanhood
and upheld her decision.
Dismissal on Academic Grounds
A case which will be treated separately, since it seems to stand almost alone
in this area of the law, is State ex rel. Nelson v. Lincoln Medical College, 05 a
privately incorporated medical school. In this case, which is unique on its facts,
the award of a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the directors to grant
a diploma to the relator was affirmed. The relator had completed all of her courses,
but the directors refused to grant her a diploma, three of them claiming that she
had failed to achieve the required grades. According to the articles of incorporation
of the school, the board of directors was to issue diplomas upon recommendation
of the dean or the faculty, but in this case the faculty had not been consulted
and the dean's recommendation was overruled by the other directors. The student
took the dispute to court, where mandamus was granted to compel production of
the test papers in question for examination. All of the papers were produced except
that of the director who was the leader of the faction refusing the diploma, the
director claiming that the paper had been destroyed before the trial. Experts for
both sides examined the test papers, and their assessments of the grades which
should have been given ranged from 54% to 94% depending on the side for which
the expert was testifying. In these circumstances the lowef court concluded that
it could not decide what the grades should be, but that the abuse of discretion
was clear. The dean was then ordered to pass on the relator's qualifications and
to award the diploma if he should conclude that she was qualified.
The other faction of the directors, however, had anticipated the court's action
and called a stockholders' meeting at which the board of directors was reorganized
and a new dean (the chief antagonist of the relator) was elected. This attempt
was held by the lower court to be too late, however, and a peremptory writ of
mandamus was awarded, upon the former dean's recommendation, to compel the
issuance of the diploma. In affirming this decision, the Supreme Court of Nebraska
said that the attempted reorganization only emphasized the defendants' bad faith
102 Id. at 352.
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and contempt for law and its enforcement. A later petition for rehearing by the
directors was denied as being untimely."'
The case stands almost alone not only because of the bitterness with which
the struggle was carried on, but also because it involved dismissal on academic
grounds rather than on a charge of misconduct. Ordinarily, as Dixon indicates,
the former is not included among the class of cases requiring a hearing,1"' since
it is not dependent upon collection and proof of facts. But it is difficult to argue
with the result in the Nelson case if, as a matter of fact, there was an abuse of
discretion and bad faith in the grading of test papers. The unjustified harm to
the student is no less in this case than if the wrongful dismissal is on grounds of
misconduct. That the case is unique is evidence that such a situation probably does
not often arise, but when and if it does there is at least some precedent for the
protection of the student.
In another case involving dismissal on academic grounds, Mliller v. Dailey,08
mandamus was issued to compel reinstatement of a student excluded from a state
normal school after the local board found that he was mentally unfit to become
a teacher and dismissed him without permitting him to complete the student teaching requirements. The court held that the student, who had successfully completed
all of his courses except the student teaching, could not, under these circumstances,
be deprived by the board of the right to an education granted by the stateespecially since others had been allowed to repeat the student teaching several
times. The board was also told that it could not anticipate the failure of the
student. This case seems to be strictly limited to its facts, for there was involved
not only the abuse of the local board's discretion, but a question of whether it had
jurisdiction at all, and it is doubtful that the result would have been the same
had the student not already completed all of the other courses.
Conclusion

Colleges and universities would seem to have little to fear from the adoption
of a systematic and fair procedure for the treatment of student dismissal cases.
In actual practice, a procedure such as that outlined in Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education,0 9 or an even more trial-like procedure, would probably have
to be utilized only rarely, for a student will usually know the grounds for his
threatened expulsion and will acquiesce when faced with the charge. But where
the student demands a hearing and challenges the existence of grounds for expulsion,
he should be entitled to be heard.
Part of the purpose of a college or university is to train its students for life
in a democracy under the rule of law, and summary dismissals which deprive
persons of valuable rights and privileges are incompatible with this goal and with
our heritage. College administrators might also bear in mind that the disruption
of college routine and the resentment among the student body which can follow
from making martyrs of students expelled by summary procedures will probably
outweigh any undesirable effects of practicing elementary fairness.
Galen, J., dissenting in State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp,:"' pointed out another
important and desirable result to be achieved by following the procedures suggested.
A case of this character should never be before the courts, and would
not therein be given serious consideration were administrative officers disposed to perform this simple duty in the premises. Their determination made
on facts presented ordinarily should never be disturbed by the courts; but

106 81 Neb. 545, 118 N.W. 122 (1908).
107 294 F.2d at 158-59; cf. West v. Bd. of Trustees of Miami Univ, 40 Ohio App. 367, 181
N.E. 144 (1931).
108 136 Cal. 212, 68 Pac. 1029 (1902).
109 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
110 81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433 (1928).
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where, as here, they act arbitrarily, it presents a proper case for judicial
interference.11
The lesson is clear. The treasured independence of the universities will not readily

be interfered with if no cause is given for the interference.

Eugene L. Kramer

111 Id. at 439 (dissenting opinion). But see N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1962, p. 39, col. 3, quoting
the chairman of the Mississippi State Board of Trustees of Higher Learning commenting on the
order of the Chancery Court of Jackson reinstating a student expelled on charges which were
based on unlawful search and seizure:
If the action of the court stands to the point where the university can't
expel because of technicalities of defense that common criminals can demand,
then the board of trustees and the institutions are in for a hard time in running decently disciplined places of learning.

